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"SWEETHEART" AND "BLACKMAIL" SETTLEMENTS
IN CLASS ACTIONS: REALITY AND REMEDY
Bruce Hay*
David Rosenbergt
I. INTRODUrON
Class action aggregation of mass tort, antitrust, securities and
consumer fraud, employment discrimination, and other damage
claims currently provokes more controversy than at any time since the
creation of the modem class action procedure. Indeed, class actions
are without doubt the most controversial subject in the civil process
today.
The controversy revolves around the settlement of class actions.
Class actions, like ordinary lawsuits between individuals, settle most of
the time. Yet unlike ordinary actions, the class action frequently in-
volves thousands or even millions of claims, often worth billions of
dollars. With so much at stake, critics have argued that the class ac-
tion settlement process will inevitably lend itself to corruption and
abuse.
Critics have focused on two dangers associated with the settle-
ment of class actions. One concerns the problem of "sweetheart" set-
tlements, in which the class members' interests are compromised by
class counsel. This complaint, which is nothing new,' arises when
class counsel allegedly settles meritorious claims for far less than they
are worth. A number of recent class action settlements have been crit-
* Professor of Law, Harvard University.
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1 As Judge Henry Friendly observed long before class settlements reached to-
day's astronomical proportions, the attorney has "every incentive to accept a settle-
ment that runs into high six figures or more regardless of how strong the claims for
much larger amounts may be.... [A] juicy bird in the hand is worth more than the
vision of a much larger one in the bush." Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347
(2d Cir. 1964). More recently, the Supreme Court has expressed a like concern. See
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2318 & n.30 (1999).
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icized on the ground that class counsel had in effect "sold out" the
class members.2
The other complaint concerns the problem of "blackmail" settle-
ments, in which the defendant is bludgeoned into settling cases for
more than they are worth. 3 This is the mirror image of the sweetheart
settlement: here, the accusation is that the class recovers more than it
should, because the class counsel is able to threaten the defendant
with a costly and risky trial. 4 This charge has also been raised in con-
nection with a number of recent cases. 5
These two complaints-sweetheart settlements and blackmail set-
tlements-conflict in their assessment of the problem associated with
class actions. One concludes that class members collect too little; the
other, that they collect too much. Yet for many, they offer comple-
mentary prescriptions: limiting the use of the class action. The critics
seem to concur on the proposition that the corruption of class settle-
ments is so pervasive and intractable that the only effective remedy is
to curtail the use of the class action itself.6
2 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 CoLuM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widows Weep: Geor-
gine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Susan P. Koniak &
George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv. 1051 (1996).
3 This concern has also been around for a long time. See HENRYJ. FRIENDLY,
FEDERALJURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973) (referring to the possible use of
class actions to extract "blackmail settlements"); Milton Handler, The Shift from Sub-
stantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Law-The Twenty Third Anuual Anti-Trust
Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (calling certain class actions "legalized
blackmail").
4 The blackmail effect of class actions involves "forcing... defendants," as Judge
Richard Posner explained, "to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury
trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal
liability." In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
5 See, e.g., Sheila Birnbaum, Class Certification-The Exception, Not the Rule, 41
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 347, 350 (1997); MaryJ. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort
Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REv. 157, 187 (1998); Peter A. Drucker, Class Certification and
Mass Torts: Are "Immature" Tort Claims Appropriate for Class Action Treatment , 29 SETON
HALL L. REv. 213, 228 (1998); Barry F. McNeil & Beth L. Fancsali, Mass Torts and Class
Actions: Facing Increasing Scrutiny, 167 F.R.D. 483, 489-90 (1996).
6 Thus, most of the critics cited in supra notes 2 and 5 have made various argu-
ments for greater adherence to, or tightening of, the prerequisites to class certifica-
tion. We do not review the details of their proposals here. For our purposes it is
enough to observe that the concern over collusive and blackmail settlements has led
many to urge greater restraint in the use of class actions. For a prominent example in
the mass tort area, see Coffee, supra note 2 (urging less use of class actions in mass
tort cases). Also, we note that these critics generally ground their concerns on anec-
dotes, not systematic empirical studies, and they give little or no attention to the risk
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In this Article, we critically examine the problems of sweetheart
and blackmail settlements in class actions. In essence, the questions
we are concerned with are the following: Are sweetheart and black-
mail settlements an inherent feature of the class action? To what ex-
tent can they be combated through proper design of the class action
procedure? What types of reform of the class action procedure-
short of abolishing or curtailing its use-would reduce the risk of
these problems? Our central conclusion is that the risks of sweetheart
and blackmail settlements have been overstated, in that these
problems can effectively be handled by courts through appropriate
class action safeguards, without resorting to the drastic remedy of
eliminating or reducing the use of the damage class action. We can
shed the risks of abusive class settlements without scuttling class ac-
tions and their considerable advantages.
Our starting point, developed in Part II of this Article, is that the
class action has great potential value for the fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of large-scale damage actions. It potentially offers substantial
advantages over the alternative of individually prosecuted actions.
(We will use the term "separate action process" to refer to the stan-
dard mode of case-by-case adjudication.) In the separate action pro-
cess, a defendant facing a large number of plaintiffs generally has an
enormous, and unwarranted, upper hand over the plaintiffs. The de-
fendant firm, but not the plaintiffs, can take advantage of economies
of scale in case preparation, enabling it to invest far more cost-effec-
tively in the litigation.7 The upshot is that the plaintiffs-precisely
because of their large number-will recover less at trial or in settle-
ment than they would have if there had been fewer of them. In effect,
the defendant is able to use the plaintiffs' numerosity against them, so
that the value of their claims is reduced for no reason other than the fact
of sweetheart and blackmail settlements in the conventional process of separate
actions.
7 By economies of scale, we refer to the idea that the cost of litigating a claim
goes down if it is bundled with other similar claims. This occurs because the invest-
ment on a common issue-that is, an issue (or type of proof such as statistical evi-
dence) shared by or generally applicable to the claims-can be used to litigate all of
the claims. So for example, in a product liability case, once the defendant has in-
vested in a scientific study on the nature of a product, that study can be used for all
claims concerning the product. Suppose that the study costs five million dollars. If
there are 1000 claims, the per-claim cost of the study is claims is $5000; if there are
100,000 claims, the per-claim cost of the study is $50. All else being equal, the more
claims there are, the more worthwhile the study becomes. Accordingly, all else being
equal, the more claims there are, the more the defendant will invest in the case.
200 1379
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that they are in large numbers.8 This is an arbitrary and, from the stand-
point of legal policy, undesirable result.9
The potential virtue of a class action is that it prevents the de-
fendant from using the plaintiffs' numerosity against them. Once the
plaintiffs' claims are aggregated and the task of representing them
assigned to a single group of attorneys, the plaintiffs can exploit the
same scale economies as the defendant when investing in the case.
Because the plaintiffs' lawyers can spread their investment over all of
the claims-just as the defendant does-it becomes possible to make
investments in the litigation that the plaintiffs could not make if the
8 This is an instance of the familiar problem of collective action. The plaintiffs
as a group would be benefited by a substantial investment in the litigation, but no
individual plaintiff (or his lawyer) finds it in his interest to make the investment. See
infra Part II.B. We do not ignore the real world of mass tort litigation in which a
relatively few corporately structured organizations of plaintiffs' attorneys compete
both to increase their respective market shares of the claims that arise from a given
mass tort event and to attract financial backing from various sources of venture capi-
tal. By aggregating large claim inventories, these "firms" exploit scale economies in
preparing the common questions en masse. Often these competitiors agree to share
some information and costs and to an extent coordinate litigation strategy. As such,
the market for mass tort claims somewhat redresses the imbalance in litigation power
between the defendant and plaintiffs. But, as we discuss in Part II.B, obvious and
basic market defects preclude plaintiffs from efficiently or indeed virtually ever
achieving the scale economies from class-wide aggregation essential to support the
optimal investment that maximizes aggregate and individual value of their claims.
Chief among the market defects thwarting collective action are, as explained below,
high organizational and other transaction costs and incessant opportunities for free-
riding. It should be noted, however, that the market's near universal aggregation of
mass tort claims (albeit divided among separate firm "inventories") expresses the pref-
erence of plaintiffs for "collective" rather than "individual" representation. If plain-
tiffs' preference rationally furthers their interest in maximizing their respective net
recoveries, as we demonstrate even partial and costly collectivization does, then it fol-
lows they benefit from more not less aggregation. The vote in the marketplace is
decidedly against the individual benefits of so-called "litigant autonomy," contra-
dicting the supposition of the Supreme Court. Thus in decreeing that class actions
are an "exception" to "our 'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have
his own day in court,'" Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2315, the Court is not merely engaging
in harmless metaphysics; it establishes a conception of individualism that in operation
will make all plaintiffs individually worse off.
9 That is, it frustrates the law's general goals of cost-effectively providing deter-
rence and compensation. For development of the deterrence, compensation, and
administrative costs of this systemic bias against plaintiffs in mass tort cases, see David
Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV.
J. LEG. (forthcoming Summer 2000).
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claims were prosecuted separately.' 0 This puts the plaintiffs in a posi-
tion of parity with the defendant, who will exploit scale economies
whether or not the case is brought as a class action. This state of af-
fairs, if it can be realized, is preferable to the separate action process,
in which the plaintiffs effectively have one hand tied behind their
back when it comes to investing in case preparation.
The question then becomes whether it is possible to realize these
potential benefits of the class action procedure. As we describe in
Part III, critics of the procedure charge that, whatever its potential
benefits in an ideal world, the class action in reality is an instrument of
abuse and corruption. They assert that class settlements inevitably fall
prey to either sweetheart deals that "sell out" plaintiffs for a fraction of
the value of their claims, or blackmail pressures that extort payments
from the defendant in excess of what the claims are really worth. Our
analysis, however, persuades us that these problems are not an inher-
ent feature of the class action device. It is true that these might be
problems if the courts were powerless to deal with them. However,
there are measures well within the courts' reach to guard against set-
tlement dangers. Indeed, even without radically changing contempo-
rary class action practice, the risk of sweetheart and blackmail
settlements can be substantially reduced if not eliminated.
Part IV of the Article addresses the problem of sweetheart settle-
ments. There we examine the regulation of class counsel's fee as a
mechanism for discouraging him from settling for less than the plain-
tiffs' claims are worth. The danger of a sweetheart settlement only
arises if the class counsel finds it profitable to settle for less than the
claims are worth. By appropriately structuring the counsel's fee, the
court can shape the attorney's incentives so that he will reject settle-
ment offers that give the plaintiffs less than the value of their claims.
Significantly, the court can accomplish this result even without
knowing the value of the claims. The solution we propose thus re-
10 This point is implicit in the widely held view that class treatment should be
available in the case of "small claims" that are not economically viable on their own.
See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual
to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into some-
thing worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.
Id. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
However, the point also applies to cases involving "large claims" that can be brought
separately. Even in such large claims, the defendant will outspend the plaintiffs on
common issues, unless the claims are aggregated in a class action.
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sponds to critics' concerns that effective judicial policing of settle-
ments is impaired by the courts' inability to determine whether a
given settlement accurately reflects the value of the plaintiffs' claims."
Moreover, the approach we advocate can solve the problem of sweet-
heart settlements in both ordinary trial class actions and the so-called
settlement-only class action. It thus also responds to critics' concerns
that settlement class actions are particularly prone to sweetheart settle-
ments, because the defendant can in effect solicit rival bids from dif-
ferent plaintiffs' lawyers who hope to serve as class counsel. If the fee
is properly structured, sweetheart settlements can be prevented even if
the defendant solicits rival bids in this manner.
Part V turns to the problem of blackmail settlements, in which
plaintiffs use trial class actions to extort settlements from defendants
that exceed the value of the plaintiffs' claims. Critics argue that the
threat of a single class trial on the issue of the defendants' liability to
the plaintiffs systematically puts irresistible pressure on the defendant
to settle, even if the evidence supporting liability is weak. The defend-
ant, according to this argument, will not want to take the gamble of
going to trial, because a plaintiff verdict could mean catastrophic
damages and even bankruptcy. Indeed, critics ignore the fact that the
prospect of a catastrophic loss from a single class trial exerts pressure
on class counsel and class members to settle for less than the value of
the class claim, even when the evidence supporting liability is strong.
Our proposed solution to this problem is simple and comprehen-
sive:12 the court should hold multiple class trials and base its judgment
on some suitably weighted combination of the different verdicts.13
This multiple-trial process makes going to trial less risky, because the
judgment does not depend on the result of a single all-or-nothing ver-
dict. It should therefore prevent either side from using the riskiness
of trial as leverage for extorting unwarranted settlement concessions
from the other side.
11 As an additional protection, we also propose that courts relax the preclusive
effect of class settlements that turn out to be insufficient to cover future claims.
12 We accept for purposes of this argument that defendant firms are risk averse in
their litigation decisions, which underlies the concern for blackmail settlements. The
validity of the assumption has not, to our knowledge, been demonstrated empirically.
13 As we describe below, the court might take the "average" of the verdicts and
compute damages accordingly. (Thus, if the court held 10 trials on liability, and
these resulted in two verdicts for the plaintiff and eight for the defendant, the defend-
ant would pay 20% of the plaintiffs' damages.) Alternatively, it might base its judg-
ment on the majority of verdicts: for example, if more than half of the verdicts favor
the plaintiffs, they collect their full damages; otherwise, they collect nothing.
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In Part VI, we pull together the different threads of the analysis in
some concluding remarks.
II. TiE GENERAL CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS
We begin by setting forth the basic reason for classing large-scale
damages actions, a reason we think has been too little appreciated in
the debate over class actions. The central rationale for the class action
aggregation-not merely in "small claims" cases, but in all cases in-
volving numerous claims for damages-is this: it enables plaintiffs to
exploit the "economies of scale" the defendant already naturally enjoys
from treating separate claims as a single litigation unit. Enabling
plaintiffs to exploit the same scale economies leads them to make
more productive litigation investments-investments that determine
both the likelihood and magnitude of recovery. Put crudely, the class
action is desirable because it enables plaintiffs as a group to recover
more than they could get in separately-prosecuted actions. 14
Allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to exploit class action scale
economies is desirable, we contend, because it simply amounts to re-
moving an artificial and unjustified (socially detrimental) advantage
that defendants have in separately-prosecuted actions. When claims
are litigated separately, the defendant (but not the plaintiffs) takes
advantage of litigation scale economies, giving the defendant an auto-
matic "upper hand" in the litigation. The result is that the defend-
ant's litigation position is artificially strengthened-not because of
anything having to do with the merits of the lawsuit, but solely because
the plaintiffs are overburdened by litigation costs. Class action aggre-
gation reduces this asymmetry, giving the plaintiffs the same scale
economies in litigation that the defendant already possesses. Our pur-
pose in what follows is to develop this point before turning to the
problem of settlement abuses.
A. The Defendant's Artificial Advantage in Separate Actions
When facing a series of separate lawsuits presenting common
questions of law or fact, the defendant will treat the plaintiffs as a de
facto class, in the sense that the defendant will seek to minimize its
liability to the plaintiffs as a group. The defendant can make a large
investment in the litigation of the common questions, and then use
the fruits of that investment in each of the individual cases. But no
plaintiff has an incentive to match the defendant's investment, if the
14 The class device may also eliminate wasteful redundancy of expenditures, but
we consider this of secondary importance.
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cases are litigated separately (or in batches comprising a subset of the
whole).15
To see the point, assume that the manufacturer of a product is
faced with a series of separate claims for personal injuries suffered by
the product's users. The claims present certain common questions,
such as whether the product is defective. A lawyer, having invested in
the litigation of this common question, may deploy that investment in
all of the claims he is involved in. For example, once resources have
been invested to acquire an expert opinion on the defectiveness issue,
the lawyer may use the fruits of that work on all of the claims.
The possibility of spreading litigation investments and reaping
the full aggregate return in this fashion creates a built-in advantage
for defendants over plaintiffs who are bringing their claims separately.
The defendant, being involved in all of the claims, will be able to
spread across and reap the full return from its investment on the com-
mon questions in the claims by all of the plaintiffs. In contrast, on the
plaintiff's side, different plaintiffs are likely to be represented by dif-
ferent lawyers; no one lawyer will be handling all the claims. There-
fore, no plaintiff's lawyer will be able to spread the costs of and reap the full
return from his investment on the common questions in all the claims.
Because of this asymmetry, the defendant will make investments
in the litigation that no plaintiffs attorney can economically match. A
litigant will invest up to the point at which the cost of additional in-
vestment exceeds the gain from additional investment. All else being
equal, a given plaintiff's attorney (handling only a fraction of the
claims) will reach that point before the defendant does.
A simple numerical example will make the point clearer. Sup-
pose our hypothetical product liability case involves 10,000 plaintiffs,
each of whom has suffered losses of $10,000. The defendant then has
a total of $100 million "on the line" in the litigation. Suppose, how-
ever, that no individual lawyer represents more than 100 plaintiffs in
the litigation. In this scenario, no lawyer's clients have more than one
million dollars "on the line" in the litigation.16
All else being equal, the defendant will invest much more than
any plaintiffs lawyer in the litigation of the common questions. Take
15 Sometimes multiple plaintiffs in a case will hire a single lawyer. Unless he is
hired by all of them (a practical impossibility), however, he will not come close to
matching the defendant's investment. In sum, given that their incremental litigation
investments continuously raise the probability of success at trial (albeit at a decreasing
rate), plaintiffs will not optimally invest to maximize aggregate value from 100% of
their claims unless they receive the full recovery from those claims.
16 Indeed, it will not even be one million dollars, assuming that the lawyer works
on a contingent fee that gives him only a fraction of the recovery.
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the issue of whether the product was defective. Suppose that by mak-
ing, say, an investment of ten million dollars, the defendant could ob-
tain an elaborate scientific study that could be used to its advantage
on the defectiveness issue in all of the cases. The defendant will ra-
tionally make this investment, so long as the studies and testimony
would more than "pay for itself" by reducing the likelihood that the
product will be found defective.
In contrast, no plaintiff's lawyer would dream of investing ten mil-
lion dollars on the defectiveness issue. That investment would swamp
the hoped-for one million dollar recovery by the plaintiffs he repre-
sents. No matter how effective the investment would be in increasing
the likelihood of recovery, it would be a waste of money for any plain-
tiff's lawyer to make the investment.
Thus, in this example, the defendant will have an elaborate scien-
tific study to buttress his position on the defectiveness question. But
no plaintiff will have a comparable study to support his position. As a
result, the defendant will have a better chance of prevailing on the
common question than it would have if the plaintiffs' attorney had
equivalent investment incentives. In effect, the defendant is able to
use his greater stake in the litigation (as compared to any individual
plaintiff's lawyer) as leverage for increasing his chances of success.
This analysis holds for virtually any type of investment on the lit-
gation of the questions common to the different plaintiffs' claims. It
could be discovery, expert witnesses, legal research, or any of numer-
ous other investments of time, effort, and money. Because the invest-
ment bears on an issue common to all the claims, the defendant can
draw on the investment in litigating all the claims. As a result, the
defendant will use the aggregate potential value of the claims-here,
$100 million-as the baseline for determining whether a given invest-
ment is worthwhile. He will accordingly be willing to make some in-
vestments on the common questions that no plaintiff's lawyer is
willing to make. This will translate into a much greater chance of pre-
vailing on the common questions than the defendant would otherwise
have.
This problem is less pronounced if the plaintiffs' claims are ag-
gregated into a class action. If a single team of attorneys has a stake in
all $100 million worth of claims, these attorneys will be willing to make
a much greater investment than an attorney handling only a single
claim for $10,000. Class treatment does not make the asymmetry of
investment go away altogether: even in a class action, the defendant
has an incentive to outspend the plaintiffs' attorneys, if the class coun-
sel are paid-as they often are-on a strict percentage-of-the recovery
basis. (The defendant has $100 million to lose, whereas class counsel
200 1385
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usually has only twenty or thirty percent of that to gain.)1 7 Compared
to the separate-action alternative, however, the class action device at
least moves plaintiffs in the direction of investment parity with the
defendant.
B. The Basic Problem: Collective Action
The key point to see in the foregoing analysis is that in separate
actions, the very fact that the plaintiffs are numerous puts them at a disad-
vantage. That is, when claims are prosecuted separately, each plaintiff
is worse off than he would have been if they were less numerous. In
the example just used, if there had only been one plaintiff-that is, if
the $100 million in losses had been concentrated on a single plain-
tiff-then he would have matched the defendant's litigation invest-
ment in a scientific study. However, because the $100 million in losses
is dispersed over many plaintiffs, no plaintiff has an incentive to make
the investment. 18
17 Here we assume the lawyer is given a fractional share of the recovery, usually in
the 20 to 30% range. Of course, the court may calculate counsel's fee on some other
basis, such as an hourly rate or a more complex percentage-of-the-recovery basis (e.g.,
10% of the first $20 million, 15% of the next $20 million, etc.), which might improve
counsel's incentives to match the defendant's investment. Frequently, however, a sim-
ple percentage-of-the-recovery formula is used.
Although beyond the scope of this Article, we note that motivating class counsel
to invest optimally in maximizing the net aggregate value of the class claim requires
pegging the fee award (percentage of recovery or hourly payment) to the optimal
level of investment, neither more nor less. In addition, the court should multiply or
increase the award by a factor that nullifies the contingent nature of the fee, which
otherwise would induce class counsel to discount the investment by the probability of
not achieving a successful outcome. To avoid the difficulty of determining fee-awards
as well as the problems of sweetheart deals, courts could simply sell or auction the
class claim to class counsel. SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'
Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommenda-
tions for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991). Better still, courts could promote an "ex
ante" claims market by authorizing first-party commercial and governmental insurers
to acquire by subrogation complete ownership control over the prosecution of their
insured's prospective (including pre-risk) tort claims. See David Rosenberg, Of End
Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV.
695, 729-30 (1989). In the absence of a contractual arrangement between insurers
for aggregating the claims arising from a mass tort event, courts could certify class
actions with one or more of the insurers being designated as class-representative. Cf
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) and
(iii) (I) (creating "rebuttable presumption ... that the most adequate plaintiff... is
the person or group of persons that... in the determination of the court, has the
largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class").
18 Indeed, if only one of many injured persons sues, there will be equivalency of
litigation power between the plaintiff and defendant. More generally, this equiva-
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It might be objected that the plaintiffs could voluntarily band to-
gether in order to match the defendant's investment. Each could
make a contribution to a fumd used for purposes of conducting a sci-
entific study for their mutual benefit. More generally, they could all
agree to be represented by a single team of lawyers who would then
find it worthwhile to match the defendant's investment on all aspects
of the common questions. However, there are two obvious obstacles
to this type of collective action.
First, there are substantial transaction costs in assembling any vol-
untary collective effort of this sort. Plaintiffs may be difficult to locate,
especially in mass exposure cases involving long latent risks. There
will be disagreements over who should contribute how much. There
will be bickering over who should control the litigation of the com-
mon questions. It would be surprising if all could put aside their dif-
ferences and unanimously agree on resolution of these issues.
Second, any collective effort will be beset by free-riding. Each
individual plaintiff will have an incentive to withhold his contribution
to the effort, hoping to benefit from the collective effort without pay-
ing his share. It may be difficult for contributors to exclude non-con-
tributors from the fruits of the collective effort. Consider the example
of a scientific study-once finished, it is hard to prevent its dissemina-
tion to third parties.
The magnitude of these problems is obviously an empirical ques-
tion. However, it would be folly to deny their existence. More pre-
cisely, it would be folly to suppose that when $100 million in claims is
dispersed over a large number of plaintiffs, they will be able to coordi-
nate their activities and invest as productively as would a single party
who owned (or faced) all $100 million in claims. It is in that sense
that the plaintiffs are hampered by their large numbers-the very fact
that the $100 million is dispersed over many people means that the
plaintiffs will have less chance of success than they would have if the
claims were not dispersed. And by the same token, their large num-
bers will put them at a disadvantage against a common defendant,
because they cannot match the defendant's productivity in
investment.
The class action device at least partially alleviates this problem, by
concentrating control of the claims in the hands of a single team of
attorneys, without the need for a negotiated voluntary collective ef-
fort. To be sure, as presently constituted the class action does not
lence holds whenever a single attorney (or team of attorneys) on each side controls
all of the filed claims, regardless of what percentage they represent of the total
number of injured individuals who could file suit.
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solve the problem of free-riding entirely, because class members may
opt out of certain classed damages actions. In general, however, it is
easier to secure aggregation of claims through the vehicle of class ac-
tions than through informal collective efforts; some plaintiffs will re-
main in the class even though they would not (for one reason or
another) have participated in informal aggregation. 19
C. The Normative Baseline
In the separate-action process, then, dispersed plaintiffs are likely
to be disadvantaged, by the very fact of their numerosity, when facing
a common defendant. Barriers to collective action will prevent them
from realizing the scale economies available to their opponent. The
device of class action aggregation reduces this asymmetry and for that
reason is prima facie desirable. By what criterion do we say this is
desirable?
The normative baseline we use here is quite simple: the outcome of
a case should not depend on how dispersed the plaintiffs are. A defendant's
liability to a given plaintiff should not be lessened (or augmented) by
virtue of the fact that many other plaintiffs were also harmed. Put
otherwise, a plaintiff should not be disadvantaged simply because he is
part of a large group.
The intuition here may be captured by the following example.
Defendants A and B engage in identical behavior. Defendant A
causes a total of $100,000 in harm, spread over two plaintiffs. Defend-
ant B causes a total $100,000 in harm, spread over 2000 plaintiffs.
Under our criterion, the victims of A should recover no more (and no
less) from A than the victims of B recover from B. The fact that B's
victims are part of a large group should neither hurt nor help them.
If the actions are prosecuted separately, B's victims will likely re-
cover less on average than A's victims. For the reasons we have identi-
fied, B (facing a large number of plaintiffs) will invest much more
heavily than the plaintiffs on the common questions and have a corre-
spondingly greater chance of prevailing. In contrast, A, facing only
two plaintiffs, will not substantially outspend the plaintiffs. Thus, A's
victims will recover more, on average, than B's victims, solely because
of their smaller number.
This is an arbitrary and, from the standpoint of legal policy, un-
desirable result. The value of a plaintiff's claim should not depend on
the number of other plaintiffs facing the same defendant. We think
19 In addition, once the opt-out period has passed, class action plaintiffs cannot
threaten to exit the collective effort. In contrast, under voluntary joinder, the con-
stant risk of exit may hamper coordination.
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most will agree to this common sense proposition. If a plaintiff has
suffered a loss of $100,000, the amount he recovers should not nor-
mally vary with the happenstance of how many others have suffered a
similar loss. It should not be the case that he recovers $100,000 if
there are only a few other plaintiffs, but (say) only $50,000 if there are
many other plaintiffs.
Put the other way around, the amount a defendant is forced to
pay a given plaintiff should not normally depend on the number of
other plaintiffs who have claims. It should not be the case that a de-
fendant who inflicts a $100,000 loss on a small number of plaintiffs
must pay them each $100,000, while a defendant who inflicts an iden-
tical loss on a large number of plaintiffs only pays them each $50,000.
Yet the separate action process invites these arbitrary results, be-
cause it gives a natural advantage to the defendant who faces a large
number of plaintiffs. From the point of view of the conventional goals
of civil liability-cost-effective deterrence and compensation, (wheth-
er viewed realistically as insurance or moralistically as corrective jus-
tice)-this is an undesirable state of affairs. 20
The potential virtue of the class action is that it curtails, though it
does not entirely eliminate, the defendant's natural incentive to out-
spend the plaintiffs on common questions. It puts the plaintiffs, as a
group, on a more nearly equal footing with the defendant in the litiga-
tion. The result is that case outcomes are less likely to be skewed by
collective action problems that have nothing to do with the merits.
III. THE PROBLEM OF CLss ACnON SETrLEMENTS
Critics of the class action, however, have raised two distinct argu-
ments against the use of the class action procedure, focusing on the
settlement of class actions. If valid, these concerns raised by the critics
might weaken the basic case for class actions just sketched.21 How-
20 On the deterrence theory of tort liability, see GuIDo ALABREsi, THE CoSTS OF
AccImErrs (1970). For discussion of various theories of tort compensation, see DAvID
ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HoLMEs: HIS THEORY OF TORTS N HISTORY, 136-138 (1995).
21 Even if the concerns were valid, there would remain the empirical question
whether the class action procedure created benefits in excess of its costs. Such analy-
sis should consider the net-benefit of class actions in relative as well as absolute terms.
Incentives for sweetheart deals certainly exist in the separate action process, especially
in the prevailing claims market dominated by corporately structured organizations of
plaintiff attorneys acquiring, prosecuting, and settling large inventories of claims en
masse. And, as we show, the potential for one-sided, systematic blackmail settlements
(exclusively disadvantaging plaintiffi and their attorneys) exists only in the separate
action process. In light of these costs of settlement abuse plus the costs of deficient
deterrence and compensation resulting from sub-optimal investment incentives, class
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ever, we deny the validity of critics' concerns; more precisely, we
deny that class actions are irremediably susceptible to settlement
abuse. We will try to demonstrate this in Parts IV and V below. Here
we will simply describe the nature of the two problems with class set-
tlement and our approach to analyzing them.
A. Two Problems with Class Settlement
The two concerns raised by critics both relate to case outcomes-
that is, the amount recovered by the class in settlement. The first con-
cern is that class action settlements will give class members too little,
because class counsel will be tempted to enter into a "sweetheart" or
collusive deal with the defendant. The second, opposing, concern, is
that class action settlements will give class members too much, because
class counsel will "blackmail" the defendant into paying the class more
than is warranted by the case's merits.
1. "Sweetheart" Settlements
Some critics have been troubled by the prospect that class coun-
sel may "sell out" the class. 22 According to this argument, the defend-
ant and the class counsel have a joint incentive to negotiate a
settlement that gives the class counsel a generous attorney's fee, but
gives the class members less than the fair value of their claims. Propo-
nents of this argument contend that courts are poorly equipped to
detect such "sweetheart" deals, because the trial judge has limited in-
formation about the value of the class's claims and therefore cannot
easily verify whether a settlement provides an appropriate recovery.23
Critics identify two contemporary innovations in class action prac-
tice that compound the problem of sweetheart settlements. The first
arises from recognition and class certification of mass tort claims
based on the present increased risk of future ultimate injury.24 The
actions may well prove the superior mode of adjudication despite the possibility of
abusive class settlement. We do not take that issue up here.
22 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2 at 1347-48; Koniak, supra note 2, at 1055-56;
Koniak & Cohen, supra note 2, at 1053-57.
23 To some extent, the court depends for this information on class counsel, who
according to this argument would have an incentive to understate the value of the
claims in order to make the settlement look generous. For example, class counsel
and the defendant might implicitly agree to understate the number of future claim-
ants in a mass exposure tort case.
24 See, e.g., Todd W. Latz, Note, Who Can Tell the Futures? Protecting Settlement Class
Action Members Without Notice, 85 VA. L. REv. 531 (1999); Alex Raskolnikov, Note, Is
There a Future for Future Claimants After Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor ?, 107 YALE
L.J. 2545 (1998).
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prime example is the mass exposure case involving workplace or envi-
ronmental release of a toxic substance that places a large population
at risk of contracting deadly disease years or decades later. Class ac-
tions composed largely of such "future injury claims" or other risk-
based claims-of necessity, to make aggregating mass tort claims
worthwhile-provide fertile ground for collusion, according to critics,
because courts cannot reliably estimate the aggregate value of these
claims.2 5
The second innovation is the so-called "settlement-only class ac-
tion," where the class is certified solely for purposes of settling the
case. In these actions, settlement negotiations often occur before the
class is certified. The defendant, together with lawyers for one or
more of the plaintiffs, negotiates a proposed classwide settlement,
which is then presented to the court for approval. Critics have argued
that this procedure enables the defendant to conduct a sort of "re-
verse auction," seeking bids from different plaintiffs' lawyers and set-
tling with the one who offers to settle for the lowest figure.2 6
According to the argument, individual plaintiffs' lawyers have an in-
centive to underbid one another, because the one who makes the win-
ning bid is designated class counsel and earns class counsel fees. This
makes it all but inevitable, the argument goes, that the resulting settle-
ment will be unfair to the class members, giving them less than the
value of their claims.
2. "Blackmail" Settlements
Other critics argue that the class action creates a systematic threat
that defendants will be blackmailed into settling on overly generous
terms, even when the class's claims are weak or marginal. This argu-
ment focuses on class actions that are certified for trial. According to
the critics, such certification makes trial very risky for the defendant:
its liability to the class is determined by a lone jury issuing a single all-
or-nothing verdict-a single "toss of the coin." If the defendant is
risk-averse, it will be willing to pay a handsome premium to avoid go-
ing to trial, even if its chances of winning at trial are strong. By threat-
ening the defendant with a classwide trial on the common issues, 27 so
25 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 1373; Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort
to Administration, 94 MrcH. L. REv. 899, 950-60 (1996); Brian Wolfman & Alan B.
Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief 71 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 439, 452 (1996).
26 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1370-73; see also Nagareda, supra note 25, at 960.
27 That is, on issues common to all of the claims, such as whether the product in
question was defective or whether the defendant was negligent.
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goes the argument, plaintiffs may be able to extract a substantial set-
tlement even for weak claims. Plaintiffs' recovery thus reflects not the
merit of their claims, but rather the defendant's fear of staking every-
thing on a single trial.
In contrast, this argument continues, if the claims are brought
separately, the defendant does not face the same kind of risks. In sep-
arate actions, a trial only determines the defendant's liability to the
individual plaintiff whose case is being tried.2 8 The plaintiff cannot
threaten the defendant with a single all-or-nothing trial that may re-
sult in liability to all of the plaintiffs. Thus, this argument concludes,
class action treatment exposes the defendant to a form of extortion
not present in the separate-action context.
This argument figured prominently in the widely discussed
Rhone-Poulenc case, 29 in which the court of appeals overturned an or-
der certifying a class of tort plaintiffs who alleged that they had con-
tracted HIV as a result of the defendant's negligent handling of blood
products used in transfusions. In the court of appeals' view, the plain-
tiffs' case must have been very weak, because twelve of thirteen indi-
vidual trials involving non-class members had resulted in defense
verdicts.30 Nonetheless, if the defendant were to lose a class trial, it
would face certain bankruptcy. That prospect, according to the court,
might lead the defendant to pay a large settlement in order to avoid a
class trial, even though the plaintiffs' claims apparently had little
merit. Part of the reason for ordering the cases to proceed separately,
the court explained, was to prevent the plaintiffs from using the threat
of a class trial to extract a settlement to which they were not entitled.31
B. Analytical Approach to Class Settlement Problems
In this Article we do not address the extent to which these settle-
ment abuses have been present in past cases or pose a realistic risk in
28 Here the argument assumes that there is no collateral estoppel or other
preclusive effect that would bind the defendant in other plaintiffs' cases.
29 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
30 See id. For reasons discussed in supra Part II, this is a non-sequitur; the plain-
tiffs' losses may reflect a weak case or may reflect the fact that they were outspent by
the defendant. We express no view on the merits of the case.
31 Similar considerations were invoked by the court of appeals to decertify a class
in the Castano cigarette litigation. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 737,
746 (5th Cir. 1996) (arguing that class certification "dramatically affects the stakes for
defendants," "magnifies and strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims,"
.makes it more likely [that a jury will find a defendant liable]," and "creates insur-
mountable pressure on defendants to settle," leading to the risk of "judicial
blackmail").
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future cases. Rather, our purpose is to investigate whether the pros-
pect of such abuses, however real, is an inherent and thus generally
intractable feature of the class action. The class action's critics often
appear to believe that the answer is yes; to these critics, the risks of
collusion and extortion are built-in properties of the class action. For
some of these critics, this defect necessarily makes the class action in-
ferior to the alternative of separately prosecuted actions.
We take a different approach from these critics who would limit
or otherwise sacrifice the scale economies of class actions to prevent
class settlement abuse. We do not deny, for example, that increasing
subclasses or opt-out opportunities for class members to create a mi-
lieu of competing interest groups might diminish the incidence of
sweetheart deals. Our concern is that such proposals also would pre-
vent plaintiffs from exploiting class-wide scale economies to make the
optimal investment that maximizes the net recovery on the class claim.
For this reason, our approach seeks to prevent abuse by designing
rules to correct class counsel's litigation incentives consistent with pre-
serving the scale economies of class-wide aggregation.
In what follows, we try to show that sweetheart and blackmail set-
tlements are not at all inherent to the class action procedure. Courts
have readily available means to minimize the danger. There is no
need to jettison the class action and to forgo the potential benefits of
class treatment. We will try to show, therefore, that the basic case for
class actions outlined in Part II remains intact and is not undermined
by the prospect of collusion or extortion in settlement.
Essentially, we argue that it is possible for the court to ensure that
class action settlements generally give the class as a whole an amount
approximately equal to the total value of its claims. Here we define
the "value of the class's claims" as the aggregate expected recovery at trial of
the plaintiffs' claims. This figure is given by the total amount the plain-
tiffs would win if their claims were tried, discounted by the possibility
that they might lose at trial. We will assume that the legal system's
objective is, all else being equal, to ensure that a settlement gives the
plaintiffs a sum not more or less than this amount.32 Thus, for exam-
ple, suppose that the aggregate expected value at trial of the plaintiffs'
claims is $100 million. Then we shall assume that the objective of the
legal system is to ensure that if the claims settle, the plaintiffs collect
about $100 million. Our hope is to show that judges can ensure this
happens with reasonable probability.
32 More specifically, we assume that assuring this level of recovery to plaintiffs
furthers the deterrence, compensation, and administrative productivity goals of civil
liability.
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IV. PREVENTING "SWEETHEART" SETTLEMENTS
In this Part we will show how a combination of devices is available
to the court to discourage class counsel from settling for less than the
class's claims are worth. Significantly, the court can achieve this goal
even if it does not know the value of the class's claims. Let us begin by
discussing this point in connection with the settlement of classes that
have been certified for trial; we then proceed to consider classes that
are certified for settlement only.
A. Trial Class Actions
Class counsel's incentives in settlement depend on the fractional
share of a settlement that he will receive relative to his fractional share
of any trial recovery. If his fractional share of a settlement is no
greater than the fractional share he would receive of the proceeds
from going to trial, then in general-with qualifications to be noted
below-he will have no incentive to settle for less than the class mem-
bers' claims are worth. That is, he will find it in his interest to "hold
out" for a settlement that gives the class members the full value of
their claims. Accordingly, the court can eliminate any incentive to
settle for too little by regulating the attorney's fee in such a way as to
ensure that the attorney's fractional share of a settlement is no greater
than his fractional share would have been of the recovery had the case
gone to trial.33
The point may be illustrated with a simple numerical example.
Assume that the class's claims as a group are worth $100 million and
that class counsel will receive a fee equal to ten percent of the class
recovery if the case goes to trial. (For simplicity's sake, assume that
class counsel is risk neutral and that going to trial and settling are
equally costly for class counsel.) 34 Then the class counsel will refuse
33 Further analysis of the appropriate fee structure is developed in Bruce Hay,
Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479
(1997).
34 We drop these assumptions below, and they are not essential to our analysis.
However, we note our skepticism about suggestions that sweetheart deals stem
from class counsel's aversion to placing a substantial pre-trial investment at risk by
going to trial. See, e.g., Judge Friendly's observation in Alleghany Corp., supra note 1.
Experienced, adequately financed, and competent class counsel would not undertake
these burdens unless, judged from the ex ante perspective, the anticipated fee-award
exceeds the total expected litigation investment-pre-trial as well as trial-including
the costs of bearing the risk of losing. In short, the actual expenditure of resources in
preparation for class trial should not affect class counsel's calculation of costs and
benefits respecting the choice to settle or go to trial. Indeed, in settlement negotia-
tions on the eve of trial, class counsel would regard pre-trial expenditures as irretriev-
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any settlement offer that gives the class less than $100 million, pro-
vided that he collects no more than ten percent of the settlement
amount. To see this, observe that in this example if he goes to trial,
the class counsel will collect ten million dollars. If he is allowed only
ten percent of the settlement recovery, then the settlement must be at
least $100 million for him to make as much as he would get by going
to trial. Note, however, that if his allowed share of a settlement is
greater than ten percent, he will perhaps be willing to settle for less
than $100 million.35
As this example suggests, the court can prevent class counsel
from having an incentive to settle for less than the class's claims are
worth by appropriately regulating counsel's distributive share of the
settlement amount.3 6 To do this, the court must estimate the frac-
tional share that class counsel would receive in the event the case were
tried and the class were to recover at trial and apply that share to any
recovery from settlement. Notably, the court does not need to know
the actual amount that the class would receive at trial; thus in this
example, it is not important for the court to know that the value of the
class's claims is $100 million. All that the court needs to estimate is
able, sunk costs. Consequently at this point the hazards of trial should concern the
attorney even less than they did originally, before undertaking the case and making
those expenditures. Having made the pre-trial investment, class counsel rationally
compares the expected recovery from class trial to the incremental (even if substantial)
costs of proceeding to trial rather than settling. That ratio is likely to yield an ex-
pected net-retum from class trial that is far more favorable than the comparison of
the expected trial recovery to total litigation costs that class counsel considered suffi-
ciently profitable to commence the class action in the first place.
Of course, a sweetheart deal might seem attractive to "inadequate" class coun-
sel-too thinly financed and risk-averse to bear the expense and uncertainties of a
high-stakes class trial. But courts possess ample power and opportunity to scrutinize
the adequacy of class counsel. And there is no dearth of adequately prepared lawyers.
Whatever may have been true in Friendly's time or even a decade ago, today, class
counsel usually is capable of marshalling the economic wherewithal for effective pros-
ecution of large-scale class actions. These "entrepreneurial lawyers" amass the re-
sources necessary for adequately funding and hedging the risks of litigating a
complex class claim through trial in a litigation class action.
This is not to deny, however, that class counsel like the defendant might well be
relatively risk averse to staking the entire class claim on a single, all-or-nothing class-
wide trial. We consider this question in Part IV.
35 For example, if his allowed share of a settlement is 20%, then he will perhaps
be willing to accept a settlement offer of $50 million awarded to the class, because
such a settlement offer would give him $10 million and thus make him as well off as
he would be by going to trial.
36 In other words, the appropriate regulation assures that the share of recovery
from settlement does not substantially exceed the forgone share of recovery from trial
(essentially the "opportunity cost" of settling).
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the fractional share of the recovery that the counsel would receive of
the proceeds from trial-in this example, ten percent.
Now, in this example we have assumed that the costs to the plain-
tiff's counsel of settling (time spent and so forth) are the same as the
cost of going to trial. This assumption is unrealistic in many cases,
because frequently going to trial will involve a much greater invest-
ment of time and other resources.3 7 However, this complication is
easily taken into account in the analysis. 38 The formula indicating the
appropriate share that the counsel should receive of a settlement he
negotiates is the following. We use the simplifying notation: let R be
the fraction of the recovery that the counsel would get in the event
the case went to trial; let X represent the additional cost to the coun-
sel of going to trial, over and above the cost he would incur in settling;
and let Wrepresent the expected recovery by the class in the event the
case goes to trial. Then the following expression indicates the appro-
priate fractional share of the settlement that the counsel should
receive:
R- (X/W)
Thus, referring to our earlier example, suppose that the lawyer
who, if the case were to go to trial, would generate an expected recov-
ery for the class of $100 million, would incur additional litigation costs
of five million dollars, and would collect ten percent of the recovery as
his fee. Simple calculation shows that he should collect five percent
of the settlement recovery that he negotiates. 39 If the class counsel
knows that his fee award will be capped at five percent of the settle-
ment amount in this example, then he will reject any settlement offer
of less than $100 million.
Accurate judicial assessment of the terms in the above expression
will doubtless be a difficult task. However, arriving at a result that
approximates these terms will not be impossible. The court can use
data from previous cases that have gone to trial to estimate both the
attorney's fractional share of the trial recovery (R) as well as the ratio
of his costs to the class's recovery (X/W). Thus even though the court
37 To be sure, the court may compensate counsel for these costs by calculating his
fee on a time-plus-expenses basis. Frequently, however, courts use a percentage-of-
the-recovery approach, either explicitly or implicitly. Our assumption in this analysis
is that the court is using a percentage-of-the-recovery approach.
38 In these cases, the opportunity cost of settling represents the counsel's share of
recovery from trial less the costs of going to trial.
39 Five percent represents counsel's real (or net) return from trial after deduct-
ing costs and thus the share of trial recovery counsel forgoes to settle.
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does not know the expected recovery in the case at hand, it may be
able to arrive at a reasonable approximation of the above terms.
Moreover, a crucial point to recognize is that it is not necessary for
the court to accurately assess the above terms in individual cases. Sometimes
the court will overestimate their value; other times it will underesti-
mate their value. All that matters is that the court's errors in this re-
gard be unbiased, in the sense that the court is no more likely to
underestimate than to overestimate their value, so that on average, the
court's assessment is accurate. For in deciding how much to settle for,
class counsel will be guided by the expected fee award in the case,
which is to say the average fee award for similar cases. So long as the
average fee award is accurate, the class counsel will have the correct
incentives.
This point is worth emphasizing by reference to our previous ex-
ample. Suppose that in our hypothetical case the correct fee award
(as indicated by the above expression) is five percent. Suppose, how-
ever, that some courts might inaccurately set the fee at three percent
while others might inaccurately set the fee at seven percent. Assume
however that, at the time he negotiates the settlement, class counsel
does not know which of these errors the court will make and that
either error is equally likely. Then the expected fee award in the case is
five percent and, accordingly, counsel will have the correct settlement
incentive-that is, to accept a settlement if and only if it gives the class
at least $100 million.
B. Settlement Class Actions
Let us now turn to the so-called settlement-only class action, in
which a class is certified for purposes of settlement alone, meaning
that if the case does not settle in class action format, then the plain-
tiffs' claims will revert to the separate action process for individual
resolution. Commentators have viewed the settlement-only class ac-
tion as being particularly susceptible to the risk of inadequate class
recoveries, because in principle the defendant can solicit competing
"bids" from different lawyers who seek to act as class counsel, and
whose success in this regard depends on their reaching a settlement
with the defendant.40 However, the same fee regulation strategy dis-
40 Critics are concerned that such "reverse auction" settlements will escape judi-
cial notice. However, they present no evidence that courts are incapable of evaluating
class settlements. Indeed, in Amchem and Ortiz, the purported major exemplars of the
"reverse auction" problem, the presiding district courts made extensive findings of
fact-never overruled on appeal-substantiating the fairness and adequacy of the
substantive terms of class settlement. Moreover, critics tend to downplay the sources
200 1397
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[v.
cussed above in connection with trial class actions can also be em-
ployed to ensure that the class members recover the fair value of their
claims in the context of settlement class actions. There is no necessary
reason that settlement class actions must tend to give the class mem-
bers less than the value of their claims.
The core task for the court here again is to regulate counsel's fee
in such a way as to ensure that his fractional share of a class settlement
he negotiates is no greater than his fractional share of what the plain-
tiffs would recover if he had not negotiated a class settlement. Under
such a fee structure, a lawyer acting on behalf of the plaintiffs will not
find it in his interest to enter into a class settlement unless the settle-
ment amount is at least as great as the expected value of the plaintiff's
claims. Any class settlement he negotiates that gives the plaintiffs less
than the value of their claims will leave him worse off than he would
be if he did not negotiate the class settlement at all. In this way, the
proposed fee regulation approach protects the class from inadequate
settlements while permitting or making possible settlements that give
the members the full value of their claim.
To see how this approach to fee regulation works, consider the
following variant on our earlier example. Assume there is a group of
plaintiffs whose claims have an aggregate value of $100 million and
that these plaintiffs have not been certified as a class for purposes of a
trial. Suppose the defendant in these actions41 approaches one of the
lawyers representing a subset of these plaintiffs and seeks to negotiate
a settlement that would bind all of the plaintiffs as part of a settlement
class action. Suppose that this lawyer represents one-tenth of the
plaintiffs, 4 2 and that he would collect one-third of the recovery on
these plaintiffs' claims if they were to be resolved individually (that is,
outside the rubric of a settlement-only class action). This is equivalent
of information that courts tap in evaluating the substance of class settlements. Thus,
any non-negligible deviation of class settlement values from separate action settle-
ment values, often well-established through years of test-case trials and inventory set-
tlements, would immediately send up a "red flag" signaling possible "sell out."
Moreover, losing bidders in the "reverse auction" would not hesitate to "blow the
whistle" on a sweetheart deal to preserve their separate action fees or take over role of
class counsel. Courts also receive knowledgeable estimates of the number as well as
judgment values of future claims from a variety of sources. These include govern-
ment agencies; unions, consumer groups, and other political organizations; academ-
ics; various layers of liability and subrogated insurers; non-settling defendants; and
other parties with contribution, indemnity, or security interests affected by the scope
and amount of settlement.
41 We assume here that the plaintiffs face a single, common defendant.
42 More precisely, he represents plaintiffs whose claims add up to one-tenth of
the aggregate value of the plaintiffs' claims as a whole.
1398 [VOL- 75:4
2 SWEETHEART" AND "BLACKMAIL" SETTLEMENTS
to saying that the lawyer stands to collect one-thirtieth of the amount
recovered by the overall group of plaintiffs in the proposed class if
there is no class settlement.
In this example, if the lawyer negotiates a class settlement with
the defendant, the lawyer should receive one-thirtieth of the amount
paid to the class. For if the lawyer knows that his share of the settle-
ment will be capped at that fraction, then he will have no incentive to
settle the case for less than $100 million. Any settlement giving the
plaintiffs less than that amount would make the lawyer worse off than
he would be by refusing to enter into a class settlement at all. Only if
the defendant offers at least $100 million will this lawyer find it in his
interest to accept the defendant's offer. Thus, capping the lawyer's
fee at one-thirtieth of the class recovery in this example induces the
lawyer to "hold out" in settlement bargaining for a settlement that
gives the class the full value of its members' claims.
This basic result holds even if there are rival lawyers bidding with
the defendant to negotiate a class settlement. So long as an individual
lawyer's fractional share of a settlement he negotiates is no greater
than his fractional share of the plaintiffs' recovery in the event he
does not negotiate a class settlement, then he has no incentive to seek
a settlement that gives the plaintiffs less than the value of their claims.
This can easily be verified by considering what the lawyer will do if a
rival has offered to settle for an amount less than $100 million. Sup-
pose for example that a rival has offered to settle for, say, ninety mil-
lion dollars. If the original lawyer's fee in a class settlement is capped
at one-thirtieth, then he has no incentive to undercut this rival's offer.
For if he declines to undercut the offer, then he will receive one-thirti-
eth of ninety million dollars, assuming that offer is accepted by the
defendant. In contrast, if he undercuts the offer with an offer to settle
for a smaller amount, then he gets one-thirtieth of that smaller
amount. No matter how many rival bidders there are, the attorney
has no incentive to take a settlement for less than the value of the
class's claims, so long as his fee is capped in the manner described.43
43 This example assumes that the attorney will collect one-third of the recovery
on each of his clients' claims if another lawyer negotiates a class settlement. That is, it
assumes that his share of his clients' recoveries is the same as another lawyer who
negotiates a class-wide settlement, as it would be if there were no class settlement at
all. The analysis must be modified if this assumption is not true. In particular, sup-
pose that if another lawyer negotiates a class-wide settlement, the original lawyer's
share of his clients' recoveries is cut from one-third to some smaller amount. Then
that smaller amount must be used as the baseline for calculating the lawyer's fee in
the event he were to negotiate a class-wide settlement. Thus, for example, suppose
that if another lawyer were to negotiate a class-wide settlement, the original lawyer's
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Once again, the central task for the court is to assess what share
of the plaintiff's recovery the class counsel would have received had
he not negotiated a class settlement. Then when overseeing the settle-
ment, the court must set counsel's fee in a way that ensures that he
receives no more than that fraction. One important implication of
this analysis is that the appropriate fee for class counsel in the context
of settlement class actions will depend heavily on counsel's share of
the claims comprising the plaintiff class. Thus, returning to our exam-
ple, if the counsel who negotiates the class settlement represents one-
tenth of the plaintiffs, he should (assuming a one-third contingent
fee) collect one-thirtieth of the class recovery; if he represents one-
twentieth of the plaintiff class, then he should only receive one-sixti-
eth of the class recovery. To determine the appropriate fee cap, the
court must multiply the fraction of the class that the lawyer represents
by the fraction of each plaintiff's recovery he would receive if he did
not negotiate a class-wide settlement. This will entail careful inquiry
into a counsel's share of the plaintiffs' claims and the fee arrange-
ments he has with them.
We recognize that this requires an estimate of the size of the
class, which may be difficult, particularly in the case of classes involv-
ing "future" claims. However, courts have information available to
them on this question. Settlement-only class actions usually culminate
years or even decades of separate action litigation of claims. 44 Court-
appointed experts can use this track record as a basis for estimating
the size of the class. Moreover, courts have another knowledgeable
and highly motivated source of information about the class: disgrun-
tled organizations of attorneys whose class settlement demands (bids)
were rejected by the defendant. These organizations have strong eco-
nomic motivation to demonstrate not only defects in estimates of the
share of his clients' recoveries would be cut from one-third to one-sixth. Then his
share of the class's claims drops from one-thirtieth to one-sixtieth. To ensure that the
lawyer does not undercut his rival's offer and agree to a settlement of less than $100
million, the court would have to cap the lawyer's fee at one-sixtieth of the class settle-
ment. Of course, the court should avoid capping class counsel's fee at a level below
the attorney's opportunity cost of serving in that capacity; fees capped below that level
will discourage leading and generally competent counsel from accepting that role.
In restricting the fees non-class counsel receive on present cases, courts also run
the risk of inhibiting the leaders among those counsel from making the investments
that generated the separate action claim values that are incorporated in the class set-
tlement. Indeed, to induce the most productive investment possiblse in the separate
action process, it is often important to assure that these leading counsel receive fees
reflecting the value their investments created for future claims.
44 See generally Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective
80 ComREt. L. REv. 941, 959 (1995).
[VOL- 75:41400
"SWEETHEART" AND "BLACKMAIL" SETTLEMENTS2000] 1401
future injury claims, but also any understatement of claim values.45
Finally, as noted above in connection with trial class actions, effective
fee regulation does not require the court to accurately estimate the
size of the class in every case. All that matters is that the court's esti-
mate not be systematically biased downwards. Provided that condition
is met, settling attorneys will have the right incentives.
C. Additional Considerations on Future Claims and
Settlement-Only Classes
We believe the approach outlined above is an effective safeguard
against sweetheart settlements in all class actions, including those
thought to be particularly susceptible to abuse-namely, cases involv-
ing future claims (such as latent disease injuries) and class actions that
are certified for settlement only. Regarding these two categories of
cases, a few additional observations are in order.
First, with respect to future claims: an additional safeguard
against collusive settlements is to release future claimants from settle-
ments that provide insufficient funding for their claims. Courts could
achieve this through what might be called a "contingent res judicata
rule." Under this approach, a court-approved settlement would have
preclusive effect-i.e., bind future claimants-only to the extent that
the settlement fund has sufficient assets to pay all qualified claims fully
in accord with the terms of settlement. If the settlement fund were
exhausted before paying all qualified claims, class members holding
unpaid claims could prosecute separate actions (or, alternatively,
bring a supplementary trial class action).46 Contingent res judicata
45 Indeed, these attorneys have a more pronounced interest, because they will
claim a share of the "future" claims and therefore a related share of the recovery from
class settlement. Frequently, non-class counsel file or threaten objections to the class
settlement for the purpose of forcing a side-settlement with class counsel that pays
over their share of such future fees. Indeed, by holding out for the fee they would
receive in the absence of class settlement, non-class counsel compel class counsel to
hold out for the true value of the class claim from the defendant in order to satisfy
their demands. Critics of settlement-only class actions reflexively brand these side-
settlements "unethical," never considering the useful fee-sharing role played by these
agreements. Indeed, eager to impugn the motives of class counsel, critics ignore a
more plausible "unethical" (socially detrimental) explanation for these side-settle-
ments, namely that the objectors are extracting nuisance-value settlements. On nui-
sance-value settlements, see David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits
Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 Tr. REv. L. & Eco. 3 (1985).
46 The defendant could be given the option of replenishing the fund to pay these
remaining claims, which would then be barred from further litigation.
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would thus remove defendant's incentive to enter into a settlement
that shortchanged future injury claims.47
Second, with respect to settlement-only class actions, we have ar-
gued that the court can use fee regulation to prevent the class from
being "sold out" by class counsel-in the sense of ensuring that class
counsel will not settle for less than the expected value of the class's
claims.48 However, we do not mean to imply by this that settlement
and trial class actions are equally effective vehicles for resolving large-
scale disputes. Settlement class actions display a notable weakness as
compared to trial class actions: the value of plaintiffs' claims is smaller in
settlement class actions, because the defendant enjoys an artificial "upper
hand" in the litigation.
The reason is quite simple: if the class has been certified for trial,
the alternative to a class settlement is a class trial. In a class trial, class
counsel has an incentive-as we saw in Part II-to make a substantial
litigation investment, as he enjoys the same economies of scale as the
defendant. By contrast, in settlement class actions, the class is certified
for settlement purposes only, meaning that if there is no class settlement
the actions will proceed separately. Yet in separate actions, as we dis-
cussed in Part II, plaintiffs' counsel do not enjoy the same scale econo-
mies as the defendant and will therefore invest less effectively in the
case.
The upshot is that claims have a greater value-that is, a greater
expected trial recovery--in trial class actions than in settlement class
actions. In settlement class actions, the value of the plaintiffs' claims
is artificially depressed by the differential economies of scale enjoyed
by plaintiffs and the defendant. For this reason, the trial class action
(more precisely, class certification on common issues for all litigation
purposes) is the preferable vehicle. Even though it is unlikely a trial
will actually be held (class settlement is much more likely), trial class
action certification is appropriate in order to eliminate the defend-
ant's artificial advantage in litigation investment.
V. PREVENTING "BLACKMAIL" SETTLEMENTS
Risk averse parties will pay a premium to avoid taking a gamble.49
It is on this basis that critics have stated that, in trial class actions,
47 Note, also, that risk-averse defendants could purchase insurance to cover the
possibility that future claims will arise in numbers far above the predicted average.
48 The court may use this together with contingent res judicata, if the case in-
volves future claims.
49 More precisely: a risk-neutral person is indifferent between a definite loss of
one dollar and a one in one hundred chance of losing $100; he therefore would pay
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defendants may be subject to extortion on weak claims: even if the
chance of losing a class trial is remote, the defendant will, it is said,
pay a great deal to avoid that small risk. Thus, class actions, it is ar-
gued, pressure defendants to pay a premium for class settlement-
more than the true value of the class claim-by forcing them to gam-
ble a great deal of their wealth on an all-or-nothing basis in a single,
class-wide jury trial.50 We believe, however, that there is a straightfor-
ward safeguard against this danger.
Before describing this safeguard, we begin by noting that critics
may well overstate the danger of blackmail against defendants5' and
ignore the danger of similar extortionate effects on class counsel and
class members as well. The all-or-nothing gamble of a single, class-
wide jury trial exerts pressure on risk-averse class counsel and class
members to settle for less than the value of the class claim. 52 More-
over, regardless of which side bears the greater risk of blackmail settle-
ment pressures in class actions, relegating claims to the separate
action process is not an appropriate cure. An all-or-nothing gamble is
no more than one dollar to avoid taking that chance. In contrast, a risk-averse person
would pay more than one dollar-perhaps much more-to avoid a one in one hun-
dred chance of losing $100.
50 As noted previously, settlement class actions do not pose the risk of "blackmail"
against defendants, because the alternative to class settlement of the class claim is not
one but a series of separate action trials of the underlying classable claims. The de-
fendant's option to demand separate action trials for all claims greatly increases the
chance that the aggregate average of all verdicts will coincide with the true total value
of all claims-that is, true value as separate compared to trial class action claims-
while reducing the chance of suffering catastrophically excessive liability to an infini-
tesimal degree. Normally, the defendants and opposing plaintiffs' attorneys more or
less cooperatively subject a small, representative sample of the claims to "test trial,"
average out the results, and incorporate them into a schedule of damages for settlilng
the bulk of the remaining present and future claims.
51 There is some reason to doubt that defendants in class actions view the pros-
pect of class trial with substantial risk aversion. Generally, class actions do not involve
aggregate damages of high magnitude relative to the wealth of defendant firms.
Some defendants, of course, are designed to become judgment-proof and bankrupt
in the event of class action. But most are organized and operated to respond in a
relatively risk-neutral fashion to all sorts of major business uncertainties, including
those posed by civil litigation that often arises from the firm's generalized risk-taking
and thus involves multiple claims of a classable nature. Many firms are owned by
stockholders with widely diversified investment portfolios and limited liability for
managerial wrongs; the firm's structure-parent-subsidiary and otherwise-also may
confine the impact of liability; and compensation and indemnity arrangements ad-
dress the risk aversion of executives and other employees. Liability insurance further
spreads the risk of a litigation catastrophe.
52 There is little reason to suppose that class counsel and class members are less
risk-averse than defendant firms.
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precisely what each plaintiff-but no defendant-faces in the separate
action process.53 Thus, we should expect the defendant to be able to
exploit plaintiff risk aversion in separate actions-by offering the
plaintiff, who may have a meritorious case, less than his claim is worth.
If it is inappropriate to face both parties with an all-or-nothing gamble
(a single class trial), we do not see how it improves things to simply
face one party-the plaintiff-with an all-or-nothing gamble (which is
what occurs with separate actions).
There is, however, a clear solution to the problem of blackmail
effects-on both sides, not just against defendants-from a single
class trial. Courts supervising class actions could avoid the problem
simply by adopting a policy of determining the class claim by multiple
class trials. Under this policy, the court would conduct a set of jury
(or bench) trials sufficient in number and representativeness to yield
a reliable basis for estimating the true value of the class claim. The
court would then take an average of the verdicts as the aggregate re-
covery for class-wide judgment. Multiple class trials would reduce the
risks associated with going to trial for the simple reason that it is far
less likely that either side will lose before all of the juries than that it
will lose before a single jury.
To illustrate the point, suppose that the odds are fifty percent
that a given jury will return a verdict for the defendant and fifty per-
cent that it will return a verdict for the class; and suppose that if the
verdict is for the class, the expected damages will be $200 million.
(Thus, the class's expected recovery at trial, taking into account the
possibility of a defendant victory, is $100 million.) In such a setting, a
single class trial is a highly risky proposition for both sides. The class
and class counsel ("class" for simplicity) have a fifty-percent chance of
recovering nothing if the case goes to trial; defendant has a fifty-per-
cent chance of losing $200 million at trial.
Suppose, however, that the court's policy is to hold a series of
trials and award the class an amount equal to the average of the
amounts awarded by individual juries. Then the odds drop substan-
tially that the class will recover nothing or that the defendant will lose
everything; the greater the number of trials held or juries consulted,
the lower these odds of an extreme outcome become. For example, if
the court holds two trials (or, equivalently, holds a single trial but em-
panels two juries), the odds that the plaintiffs will recover nothing
drop to one in four; if the court holds four trials, the odds drop to one
53 In the separate action process, trial is an all-or-nothing event for the plaintiff; a
loss may be catastrophic. But it is not an all-or-nothing event for the defendant firm;
a loss means paying only one plaintiff.
[VCOL 75:41404
0 SWEETHEART" AND "BLACKMAIL" SETTLEMENTS
in sixteen; if the court holds ten trials, the odds drop to roughly one
in one thousand. In making it far more likely that the class will re-
cover damages (most likely averaging to $100 million), but less likely
that the defendant will suffer a total loss ($200 million), holding mul-
tiple class trials reduces the riskiness to both sides of forgoing settle-
ment in favor of trial.
Several points are worth emphasizing about the policy of holding
multiple trials. First, the policy is consistent with the distributive norm
of civil liability. Multiple class trials neither increase nor decrease the
overall liability exposure of defendants or recovery by classes. Assum-
ing courts award a figure equal to the average verdict returned by dif-
ferent juries, the aggregate expected judgment from multiple class
trials remains the same as it would be from a single trial. This is evi-
dent from the example just used. The class's expected recovery in any
single trial is $100 million (fifty percent of $200 million). But this
implies that the class's expected recovery from a series of trials in the
case is simply the average expected recovery of each trial, namely,
$100 million. The policy of holding multiple trials and averaging the
result has no effect on the true value of the class claim. It simply af-
fects the variation (or variance) in the possible actual outcomes. In
particular, it reduces this variance, making it more likely that the
class's actual recovery after concluding the series of trials is approxi-
mately equal to the expected recovery of $100 million.54
Second, the multiple class trials approach can be adapted for
both general and special verdict trials. In the context of general ver-
dict trials, where the jury is charged with deciding both liability and
damages for the class as a whole, the court would take the average of
different jury awards (with a verdict for the defendant on liability be-
ing equivalent to a damage award of zero). In special verdict trials,
the procedure could easily be modified to yield equivalent results.
For example, if the jury is charged with deciding the question of liabil-
ity alone, the court could discount the ultimate damage award by the
proportion of jury verdicts for the defendant. If three-fifths of the
juries return a verdict against the defendant, the court could award
54 We conjecture that this variance-reduction is desirable on grounds of individ-
ual justice, quite apart from its effect of reducing blackmail settlements. We do not
pursue that point here. For discussion, see Bruce Hay and David Rosenberg, The
Individual Justice of Averaging (March 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the authors), and see also David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-
Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 210, 245-48 & n.90 (1996).
2000] 1405
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the class three-fifths of the aggregate damages, and so forth. 55 Once
again, this procedure reduces the risks associated with the trial pro-
cess without affecting in any way the true value of the class claim.
Third, confronting the parties with the prospect of more than
one, rather than a single, class trial would not necessarily increase
their litigation costs nor dull appropriate incentives to settle.
Although it would depend on the nature and complexity of the com-
mon questions, conducting repeat trials probably entails higher costs,
for example, to pay for the reappearance of expert witnesses. But de-
spite redundancy costs, multiple class trials might well reduce the par-
ties' costs overall. The prospect of a single class trial would induce
risk-averse parties to spend excessively on pre-trial preparation as a
measure of insurance against the possible horrendous verdict. Courts
could streamline the process to reduce redundant trial costs, for ex-
ample by convening and averaging the judgments of more than one
jury in a single trial, or employing video taped testimony in several
trials. The parties might themselves increase efficiency by confining
the scope of multiple trials to the contentious issues that stand in the
way of settlement. In general, class settlement should occur about as
often in the shadow of multiple class trials as a single class trial. Only
the terms of settlement will change, and for the better-because
neither side will be able to exploit the other's risk aversion toward a
single all-or-nothing trial.
Finally, conducting multiple class action test-trials to derive aver-
age claim values for settling the bulk of the remaining present and
future claims replicates prevailing practice in the separate action pro-
cess, with one major difference. In contrast to the separate action
process, trial class certification assures plaintiffs the same scale econ-
omy incentives defendants have to invest optimally in maximizing the
average value from litigating multiple test-trials of the common
questions.
One possible objection to this proposal is that the Seventh
Amendment may be read to give a party the right to insist on a single
all-or-nothing trial.56 Perhaps, therefore, a court could not force a
party, against his will, to submit to our proposed multiple-trial proce-
dure. However, we believe courts can properly secure the consent of
55 The discounting method could be used to tailor the aggregate award accord-
ing to a series of special verdicts on causation, differences in governing law, and other
elements and variables affecting the true value of the class claim.
56 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("No fact tried by ajury shall be otherwise reexam-
ined in any court of the United States."). The question whether the Seventh Amend-
ment limits the power of federal courts to hold a series of trials in this fashion is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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both plaintiffs and defendants to the procedure. If the defendant re-
sists, the court can offer the alternative of a single class trial (which, by
assumption, does not violate the defendant's right to a single trial). If
the plaintiffs resist, the court can give them the alternative of separate
individual trials (which, again, does not violate any plaintiffs right to a
single trial). Such court-exerted pressure is, we think, a proper means
to prevent either party from exploiting the other's risk aversion. 57
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We can bring together the different strands of the argument by
reverting to our earlier example of a large-scale product liability case.
Assume that the plaintiffs have suffered a total of $200 million in dam-
ages. If their claims are prosecuted separately, the defendant will
have an artificial advantage in the litigation, born of the economies of
scale it enjoys in litigating the common questions in the case (such as
whether the product was defective). If, instead, the claims are unified
in a class action certified for trial, then the plaintiffs' class counsel has
an incentive to match the defendant's litigation investment. The
plaintiffs' claims have more value as a group, therefore, if they are
aggregated into a class action. For reasons developed in Part H, we
think this value-enhancing effect of aggregation is quite appropriate.
Put otherwise, we think that forcing the plaintiffs to proceed sepa-
rately has the effect of inappropriately depressing the value of the
plaintiffs' claims, by putting them at an artificial disadvantage in
investment.
Suppose, then, that if the claims are brought as a class action, the
plaintiffs would have a fifty percent chance of prevailing at trial, be-
cause reasonable juries may differ on the question of liability. In that
case, the expected value of the plaintiffs' claims is $100 million-
which is therefore the amount the plaintiffs ought to recover in settle-
ment, according to our proposed baseline. We have suggested that,
with a combination of appropriate fee regulation and multiple trials,
the court can ensure that the case settles for approximately that fig-
ure. As we have stressed, the court does not need to know the value of
57 In response to the formal restrictions of the Seventh Amendment, courts could
subdivide the class or certify a number of smaller class actions, and appoint the same
team of class counsel to represent all subclasses or class actions. This process would
achieve the effect of providing multiple trials while at the same time preserving the
scale economies of a single-trial class action. It should also be noted that even if
holding a series of trials in this fashion were not permitted, it might nonetheless be
permissible to hold a single trial with several juries simultaneously impaneled to
render judgment, with the court taking the average verdict to decide the case.
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the class's claims in order to bring about that result, provided that it
follows the guidelines in Parts IV and V.
We do not contend that our proposals will work perfectly. Even
when implemented, there may be some residual risks of abuse in class
action settlements. But perfection is not an appropriate standard by
which to judge. The emphasis must be on a comparison between
available alternatives. As we have tried to show, the separate-action
alternative to class action treatment is itself highly imperfect-much
more so, in our judgment, than class actions that proceed along the
lines we have suggested.
